Today trust is a key factor in distributed and collaborative environments aimed to model participating entities' behavior, and to foresee and predict their expected actions in the future. Yet, prior to the first interaction of a new party in the system, trust and reputation models face a great challenge: how to assign an accurate initial reputation score to a newcomer? The answer needs to tackle two well-known problems, namely, cold-start and reputation bootstrapping. Cold-start is a common issue to any information system when it boots for the very first time, while reputation bootstrapping especially affects highly distributed scenarios, where mobile entities travel across domains and collaborate with a number of them. In this paper, we focus on the two problems and, in order to address them, we present a novel reputation bootstrapping mechanism for a newcomer in a collaborative alert system aimed at detecting distributed threats. The experiments conducted show the accuracy of our proposal as well as its robustness in the presence of ill-intentioned entities.
Introduction
Monitoring and analysis capabilities of existing Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) are limited to a small portion of the overall network to which they belong. In this sense, the alarms produced by them are considered as isolated incidents, as they would make little sense if analyzed individually [1] . For example, attackers can launch a UDP port denial-of-service attack, described in [2] by the Computer Emergency Response Team, by injecting a large number of dummy packets over the entire network. They can exploit this vulnerability without being detected by overcharging services placed at different network segments (e.g., by sending out ICMP ECHO packets). The IDSs installed in each network segment may not trigger alarms if the number of packets sent to each segment is below a certain threshold. Nevertheless, the entire network could become congested, and thus compromised.
Collaborative alert systems
Building a collective knowledge base of alerts is a prerequisite for detecting distributed threats, such as the one introduced above. This can be acquired by sharing the alerts that each IDS produces individually, thereby achieving a more global perception about what is happening in the entire network. Therefore, IDSs need to establish a Collaborative Alert System (CAS) capable of enhancing the accuracy in detecting distributed threats [3] .
In a traditional network, IDSs are installed, configured, and updated by system administrators who possess the necessary technical skills to do that as experts in security [4, 5] . We name these types of entities as static IDSs, as they are permanently placed in a given zone of the network to report alerts about suspicious events in their monitoring scope. In despite of that, the static configuration of networks is evolving towards a new paradigm where mobility of users is hoarding a great interest. This fact is prompted by users who can own devices at affordable prices (laptops and smart phones) with high computing performance and new added-value features, such as wireless communication capabilities. In the context of collaborative alert systems, organizations can leverage this opportunity to gather further security alerts that roaming users' devices can produce while temporarily staying in their domains.
Roaming users can (voluntarily) join to collaborate with security domains by sharing the alerts that they are capable of producing. In order to encourage cooperation, involved organizations can reward roaming users with some incentives, for example by granting them higher bandwidth. We name these types of entities as mobile IDSs, as they present special capabilities in mobility.
Regardless of the type of entity, the CAS has to be sure that all its IDSs exhibit a good and expected behavior about the alerts that they share. Disclosing bogus alerts can compromise the system to reduce its accuracy in detecting distributed threats. They will usually come from malicious or misbehaving IDSs, possibly due to an internal malfunctioning or as a consequence of being compromised by an attacker. Thus, the publication of bogus alerts from malicious IDSs can mistakenly lead the CAS to believe that a threat has actually occurred, when it really has not.
Motivation
A great number of trust and reputation models have emerged in recent years to measure the goodness of information sources [6, 7] . They provide a way of finding out bad behaviors (alerts shared by malicious IDSs, in our context) by analyzing all interactions they have had with the system; either interactions with a given domain (direct experiences) or by requesting recommendations to others (indirect experiences) [8] . In any case, almost all of these models assume that the system is up and running, where all entities have a certain reputation score. This assumption is, however, hard enough to realize in practice due to
• at the beginning, no entity has yet interacted with any other (there is no historical information about anyone);
• a new entity can join, or can be connected to, the system for the very first time (there is no information about this newcomer); or
• in highly distributed networks, mobile entities can travel across heterogeneous domains with which they have not yet interacted.
The first two cases are often known in recommender systems as the cold-start problem [9] , while the latter is related to the reputation bootstrapping problem [10] . Both problems have been widely discussed in the literature [11, 12] although, as far as we know, this is an unexplored research area in the context of collaborative alert systems. A static or mobile IDS, or any other entity that wants to collaborate with the CAS, will be involved in the cold-start problem at the least once, when interacting with the system for the first time. Nevertheless, only mobile IDSs can be involved in the reputation bootstrapping problem as they are the only ones that can join and leave domains freely at any time.
Our contribution
We propose a novel reputation-based bootstrapping mechanism aimed at assigning an initial reputation score to a newcomer, either a static or mobile IDS, to encompass the following two situations: no historical information is available about the newcomer (cold-start problem) and, in highly distributed networks, historical information is available but in other domains where the newcomer has collaborated (reputation bootstrapping problem). We also stretch this mechanism to compute the initial trust that a security domain can deposit on other domains when they want to establish a new trust relationship each other.
In this paper, we have identified the three main actors (newcomers) that can join a security domain for collaboration purposes, namely:
• static IDSs, permanently placed in a network to monitor local services and resources of a specific network zone;
• mobile IDSs, belonging to users who want to collaborate with security domains to gain certain benefits; and
• security domains that want to improve their accuracy in detecting distributed threats by exchanging security information (mainly alerts) with other trusted domains.
Capabilities, or detection skills, that an IDS can offer to a security domain are used in this paper to compute its initial reputation score. In this sense, a security domain can assign a higher initial reputation score to whom can supply alerts related to threats uncovered by the rest of the domain's IDSs, or even regarding certain detection zones covered by "suspicious" IDSs (those with a low reputation score). On the other hand, computing the initial trust between two security domains also relies on their detection skills, by quantifying their similarity to detect common threats in which they are interested. The most similarity among detection skills are, the more initial trust score between security domains it will be. Depending on the detection skills avowed by an IDS, or by a security domain, its reputation score will vary in a different manner throughout time. It will increase or decrease more rapidly according to the detection skills revealed by the newcomer during its bootstrapping phase.
Apart from detection skills, other information sources can be also incorporated in computing the initial reputation score on a newcomer. In this paper, recommendations from trusted third parties are considered, as a newcomer may have been collaborating with other CAS's trusted domains from which to gather past behaviors of it [13] ; a new entity can be a complete stranger from the perspective of the domain, but not for the CAS. Additionally, security mechanisms used by IDSs or security domains are also taken into consideration to measure their fortress when establishing secure communications, or when they authenticate as legitimate entities of the CAS.
Paper organization
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the design of a generic collaborative alert system, as well as its definition through a motivating example that will be used later to clearly expose our proposal. Section 3 introduces how a newcomer (an IDS or a domain) is valuated when it joins a new security domain. In Section 4, we present the reputation management model aimed at computing the initial reputation score of a newcomer, while Section 5 presents some experimental results to illustrate the accuracy and robustness of our proposal. Section 6 outlines the main related work and, finally, Section 7 summarizes our contributions and draws future research directions.
Design of a collaborative alert system
The adoption of Information and Communication Technologies (ICT) by organizations has led to build large-scale systems to improve their business practices, from the reduction in costs to a better satisfaction from the customers' perspective. Due to the growing size and complexity of these systems, the scalability in terms of performance and security becomes an important issue. This problem is sharply reflected in the context of intrusion detection systems, where they have to monitor and analyze huge amount of data in real-time.
A partially-decentralized collaborative alert system
The design of our Collaborative Alert System (CAS) aims to achieve a trade-off between management and traffic overhead through a partially-decentralized scheme. It combines the two currently existing models: centralized and fully decentralized approaches. The use of one of them overcomes the drawbacks introduced by the other, and vice versa. Centralized approaches sort out the traffic overhead in the system and the complexity in its management, while the decentralized ones avoid the problems of having a single point of failure and the lack of scalability.
Advantages in using partially-decentralized schemes are achieved by means of a set of nodes, named superpeers or supernodes, that act as centralized servers in the limited portion on their network [14] . The exchange of alerts among 3 superpeers constitutes the desired decentralized system, where such alerts (produced by each IDS separately) are shared by following a centralized approach. As a result, the design of our CAS allows building a scalable and robust framework for collaboration aimed to lessen the complexity in its management and the network traffic overhead, as well as avoiding the single-point failure problem. A collaborative alert system is composed of a set of n security domains (D) in which the entire system is divided, denoted as CAS = {D 1 , D 2 , ..., D n }. Each security domain may correspond to a network segment of a given organization, although domains from different administrative units may also be part of the CAS under certain collaboration agreements among them [15] . Each of these security domains defines a Collaborative Intrusion Detection Network (CIDN) [16, 17] that is in turn composed of a significant number of IDSs; either Host-based IDSs (HIDS), monitoring and analyzing vulnerabilities of a stand-alone computer, or Network-based IDSs (NIDS), detecting anomaly activities by inspecting the traffic that flows through the network [18] .
The CIDN of a security domain is an aggrupation of static and mobile IDSs that could follow distinct ways of collaboration with other trusted domains, for example depending on their internal security policies. Static and mobile IDSs will share all alerts produced by each of them separately, whereas CIDNs will only exchange potential information for detection purposes at domain level (e.g., just sharing alerts with high severity levels).
Among all the static IDSs of a particular CIDN, we have chosen one of them to be the head or leader of it. We refer to this as Domain Leader (DL). This entity is the superpeer that defines our partially-decentralized system, acting as the representative body of its CIDN in charge of i) sharing the alerts detected by the IDSs of its CIDN with the CIDNs of other domains; and ii) requesting recommendations to other CIDNs about a newcomer in order to compute its initial reputation score [19] . Both actions will be performed with those CIDNs, through their leaders, with which it keeps up a trusted collaborative relationship. The election procedure of this leader is out of scope of this paper.
An example of a CAS can be found in Figure 1 . This CAS is composed of the CIDNs of nine security domains, Figure 1 only shows, for clarity, the internal structure of three domains (D A , D E , and D I ), although the rest is also organized in the same way. All concepts defined above can be recognized in Figure 1 . Collaborative relationships established among security domains [20] , also known as trust paths, have been also defined in this figure. These trust paths are represented by arrows, labeling the confidence that each domain has on the other with a weight in [0,1].
A motivating example
Let us consider the CAS presented in Figure 1 , where the three types of entities in which this work is focused on can be readily differentiated: static IDSs, mobile IDSs, and security domains. Firstly, the CIDN where a new static IDS is installed can only rely on the information the latter can provide to the former, e.g., the IDS's detection skills, in order to compute its initial reputation score. Nevertheless, computing this score between two security domains could also make use of recommendations gathered from other trusted domains. For example, D A can incorporate recommendations from D C about the new domain D B (see Figure 1 ) in computing the first reputation of the latter.
On the other hand, the mobile IDS of Figure 1 travels from one security domain to another, jumping between two administrative domains, where it wants to join and collaborate with each of them so as to share the alerts it produces. This mobile IDS initially joins the D A 's CIDN with which it has never interacted. This situation reflects the cold-start problem stated above, as no domain (including the D A 's CIDN) has historical information about this mobile IDS; it is a complete stranger in the CAS. As no recommendation is available, the initial reputation score of the mobile IDS can only be computed by using personal information gathered directly from it.
After collaborating with the D A 's CIDN, the mobile IDS travels from D A to D E with which has not yet interacted. This is an unknown entity from the perspective of D E , although not for the CAS. It previously stayed in D A with which D E holds a direct collaborative relationship, as well as having other indirect trust relationships through trusted third parties. The shortest trust path is the direct trust relationship existing between D E and D A ; that is, tp 1 
is the confidence that D w has on D x for a given trust path tp i (D w , D x ) and T (D y , D z ) is the direct trust that D y has on its neighbor D z . Even though this is the shortest path, there exist other alternatives to infer the confidence between two domains by making use of indirect trust relationships.
At first sight, it might seem obvious that shortest trust paths are stronger than the longest ones, as suggested in [21] . However, in [22] , the authors argued that the trust inferred from long trust paths with high levels of confidence may be stronger than those inferred from short trust paths with low degrees of confidence. In this sense, D E should also compute its confidence on D A by using tp 2 (D E , D A ) and tp 3 (D E , D A ) as follows.
Two typical functions have been used in both equations: a mean value property and a multiplicative aggregation function, denoted as ⊗. Both indirect trust relationships initially seem to report higher rates of confidence (by using the mean function) than the one provided by the direct trust relationship. Among them, tp 3 (D E , D A ) even has a slightly higher confidence score than tp 2 (D E , D A ). Thus, D E should choose tp 3 (D E , D A ) as the best trust path, as it is the most reputable one of the three first paths shown in Figure 2 .
Regarding the last trust path shown in Figure 2 , tp 4 (D E , D A ), it is not even built. It is too long and exceeds the maximum length until reaching the time to live threshold, this being typically set to seven in P2P networks. Apart 5 from that, a number of other factors could also be taken into account in computing the confidence on trust paths in order to penalize lengthy paths, known in the literature as a forgetting factor [16] . As the length of a trust path increases, the confidence of the requesting domain on the final recommendation will be lower. Another important factor that would have to be taken into account is the change between administrative domains. The confidence on a trust path would be decremented according to the trustworthiness that requesting administrative domains have on the others [23] . This fact may then swing the decision to opt for tp 2 (D E , D A ) rather than tp 3 (D E , D A ), as the latter needs to change between two administrative domains.
Finally, the mobile IDS moves from D E to D I , jumping to a new administrative domain. As before, the D I 's CIDN has no information about the mobile IDS as it is a complete unknown entity for this domain, although D I may request its past behavior to other domains in which it was collaborating (e.g., D A and D E ). In this case, D I has to focus its search on using indirect trust relationships, as this domain has no direct relationship with D A or D E .
Between the two problems introduced above, cold-start initially appears to bear higher costs than reputation bootstrapping. The former needs an in-depth search in the CAS to gather recommendations about the newcomer from other trusted domains. However, a given CIDN only faces the cold-start problem with mobile IDSs joining such a CIDN for their very first time; the remaining times, just a bootstrapping process is required (with a lower rate in terms of cost). Recommendation requests could be sent to certain domains (just a reduced number of neighbors) as long as mobile IDSs are traced to intuit their path of movement. Note that, although we have not provided a cost analysis of our proposal, we believe that mobile IDSs do not suppose a problem in scalability terms or a problem so as to manage them in a real-time fashion.
All works published in the literature, discussed later in Section 6, address partially some previous issues to compute the initial reputation score of a newcomer; either static IDSs, mobile IDSs, or new trust relationships between security domains. The model proposed in subsequent sections tackles all the cases discussed above.
Valuation on newcomers
As previously mentioned, several sorts of entities can collaborate with a CIDN to help in building a collective knowledge base of alerts: static IDSs, mobile IDSs, and security domains. Note that only mobile IDSs will usually make short-term interactions with a CIDN, while the rest will request their participation for a long-term period. Figure 3 shows a sequence diagram with the different steps that the i-th newcomer, denoted as NC i , has to perform when it wants to join the D X 's CIDN. It is worth noting that Rec(NC i ) reflects the recommendations that other entities can provide to the leader of the D X 's CIDN, DL X , in order to compute the initial reputation score of NC i .
Interaction profile
The remainder of this section describes each of the steps marked with a number in Figure 3 , giving a special emphasis to those interactions accomplished by NC i according to its type of entity. An identifier is also attached to each number to clear up which type of entity is involved in each step: static IDS [s], mobile IDS [m], and domain [d] . The distinction of this type is carried out by DL X during the authentication process executed by NC i in Step 1.
3.1.1.
Step 1: Ask collaboration and, optionally, authentication phase NC i contacts DL X to join the D X 's CIDN so as to participate with the latter by sharing the alerts it can produce. Optionally for mobile IDSs, and required for static IDSs and security domains, NC i can authenticate into D X as a legitimate entity of the CAS. To encourage mobile IDSs, this authentication may provide NC i a higher reputation score with better benefits in terms of connectivity.
The distinction in the type of entity is performed in this step depending on whether the entity is authenticated or not. If not, DL X will automatically consider that NC i is a mobile IDS. Otherwise, this decision will depend on the credentials presented by NC i in its authentication process. NC i will be considered as a static IDS if its credentials belong to a system administrator (it is a well-known entity for D X ). However, NC i is considered as the CIDN leader of another domain when its credentials do not belong to D X , where it is authenticating, and do to a security domain with which D X has a pending agreement of collaboration.
It is worth noting that a roaming user (mobile IDS's holder) may optionally authenticate in D X , but in this case, the credentials do not identify him/her as a CIDN administrator (DL X can discriminate the mobile IDS between static and mobile). The validation of credentials is argued and discussed in Section 3.2. 6 Step 2: Gather recommendations on the newcomer from mobile IDSs DL X asks all the mobile IDSs currently participating in the D X 's CIDN whether some of them have previously met with NC i in other security domains. If so, they can offer DL X some useful information about NC i ; possibly, recommendations from past experiences with security domains unreachable from D X . Obviously, this step only makes sense when NC i is a mobile IDS, as only they can meet in other places. Together with such a recommendation, each mobile IDS has also to provide a timestamp indicating how long since the last interaction performed by NC i in the remote domain; concretely, the last alert reported by it. This timestamp will help DL X to decide the validity of the recommendation throughout time.
Step 3: Search for data on the newcomer
In a parallel way to Step 2, DL X checks if NC i has previously collaborated with the D X 's CIDN so as to classify the newcomer as a stranger or a well-known entity for the domain. In the latter case, DL X has to check out if the reputation score stored for NC i can be still considered as fresh. If such a reputation is still valid for D X , DL X passes either directly to Step 7, to request NC i its detection skills for checking them out against the ones stored by the D X 's CIDN, or to Step 10 to immediately start the collaboration with the newcomer. This mechanism allows reducing the traffic overhead by avoiding the spreading of recommendation requests about a well-known entity. Otherwise, if NC i is a complete stranger for D X , or a well-known entity but its reputation is too old for being considered as valid, DL X passes to Step 4 to gather recommendations on NC i from other trusted domains. DL X aims to gather ratings regarding possible indirect experiences performed by NC i in other domains.
Step 3 is mandatory to any type of entity, as they might temporarily leave and rejoin a CIDN in a short time.
3.1.4.
Step 4: Ask recommendations on the newcomer to direct neighbors DL X sends a recommendation request to all the neighboring leaders of other domains with which it keeps up a direct and trusted collaborative relationship. In the example presented in Figure 1 , DL A will send this request to DL C and DL E , while DL I will do it to DL D (belonging to other administrative domain) and locally to DL H as a member of its same administrative domain. This process is spread over the entire CAS until reaching the time to live threshold, for example to seven in P2P networks.
Step 5: Search for data and ask recommendations to other neighbors
Each leader of the neighboring CIDNs, DL Y in Figure 3 for simplicity, checks if NC i has previously performed some interaction with such a security domain. This process coincides with Step 3, but using in this new step the local records stored in each security domain. As before, this process is spread to other security domains with which the current one maintains a direct trust relationship.
Step 6: Retrieve recommendations from the CAS on the newcomer
Each leader in the trust path retrieves a set of recommendation responses, if any; one from each of its trusted neighbors. A recommendation response is a 3-tuple that contains
• the confidence on the current trust path, aggregated by all security domains that have built it up so far;
• the length of the trust path until reaching back the current domain (DL X in Figure 3) ; and
• the target recommendation back-propagated from the domain where NC i was interacting (e.g., D A in Figure 2 ).
Each recommendation response (one per neighbor) is aggregated again, but now taking the direct trust that the current domain has on its corresponding neighbor; in Figure 3 , the trustworthiness between D X and D Y . The trust path with the highest confidence will be chosen as being the most promising one, which will be sent back to the requesting leader. Note that the length of the trust path is incremented by one before sending the response back. This process will be repeated recursively until reaching the source leader (DL X in Figure 3 ). In Figure 1 , DL G will return to DL H a single recommendation response generated from the ones gathered from DL C and DL F . This mechanism provides a privacy-preserving way to hide recommendation ratings among non-direct neighboring domains.
The previous three steps are performed when NC i is either a mobile IDS or a security domain. It is not required for static IDSs as they are permanently installed in a single security domain; no domain will have information about this type of newcomer. Furthermore, it is worth noting that Steps 2 and 3 can be carried out in a parallel way, for performance issues, together with Steps 4, 5, and 6.
Step 7: Gather detection skills
Apart from the recommendations gathered by DL X from other entities, if any, the initial reputation score of NC i will vary depending on the detection skills that it can offer to the D X 's CIDN. These detection skills might strengthen the D X 's CIDN with valuable alerts to improve its detection accuracy. To that end, DL X demands the detection skills to NC i for being included in computing its reputation. So, DL X will be able to quantify either the usefulness of the newcomer for the D X 's CIDN, if NC i is a static or mobile IDS, or the similarity between D X and the security domain with which wants to establish a new trust relationship (e.g., between D A and D B in Figure 1 ).
How detection skills are modeled, and how the usefulness and similarity models are formally defined, are widely explained in Section 4.1.
3.1.8.
Step 8: Negotiation to tune detection skills? DL X might propound NC i some minor changes in its detection skills, e.g., by (de)activating some of them, so that the latter can achieve a better initial reputation score. Furthermore, such changes are also more interesting from the perspective of the D X 's CIDN, as they can provide more valuable alerts about threats in which D X is interested. This negotiation phase is fully described in Section 4.1.2 according to the type of entity that NC i represents.
Step 8 is only executed when NC i is a mobile IDS, as it makes no sense for static IDSs and security domains. Note also that Steps 7 and 8 can be carried out concurrently together with Steps 4, 5, and 6 for performance issues.
Step 9: Compute the initial reputation score of the newcomer
Computing the initial reputation score of NC i is accomplished from all data gathered in previous steps, if any. These data correspond to the ones obtained directly from NC i (public credentials used in the authentication process, detection skills, and its willingness to collaborate) and some behavioral-based records from external information sources. Among the latter group, DL X can have at its disposal a rich variety of i) interaction logs with NC i stored in the databases of D X , known as direct experiences; and ii) recommendations provided by other trusted third parties coming from indirect experiences. Quantifying the initial reputation score of NC i is widely explained in Section 4.3.
Step 10: Collaboration after enforcing obligations
Once computed the initial reputation score of NC i , DL X may propose the underlying network components of D X to deploy some incentive-based policies for NC i . These policies will be enforced as a set of network access rules, customized for NC i , in accordance with the NC i 's initial reputation score.
Authentication and secure inter-domain communications
Two of the environments previously described require appropriate strong security mechanisms. One arising from the proposed design of a CAS in Section 2, related to the exchange of alerts and recommendations among security domains (it needs a secure inter-domain communication method), and another from the interaction profile described in Section 3.1, where newcomers need to launch an authentication process.
In this work, a secure and reliable asymmetric cryptographic primitive has been chosen by using X.509 certificates [24] . This provides a way of protecting communication and authentication processes of a newcomer against well-known security threats, such as confidentiality, data integrity, and authenticity. Furthermore, asymmetric keying mechanisms allow identifying the execution of Sybil attacks [25, 26] . This is a common security threat in trust and reputation systems, where a malicious entity instantiates a large number of bogus peers to render bad services or to provide good recommendations each other to garner a better (undeserved) reputation.
The use of such an X.509-based security mechanism implies to check the requesting peer's certificate before starting up the communication or interaction with the target peer. Bad or revoked credentials will lead the latter to cancel the operation requested by the former. Thus, the validation process has to be performed by the target peer when a single unidirectional interaction is requested (e.g., when a newcomer wants to authenticate into the security domain). However, when a bidirectional communication is required, e.g., two security domains want to collaborate each other, the authentication process has to be carried out by the CIDN leaders in a separate way.
The validation of X.509 certificates in multi-domain environments entails, first, building candidate certification paths between the Certification Authority (CA) that issued the target certificate and one of the recognized Trust Anchors in which the validating peer trusts. After this process, the validating peer has to check whether the candidate certification paths are valid (at least, one of them has to be valid so as to grant the expected interaction or communication). In order to avoid this complex process of building and validating candidate certification paths, validating peers might use a trusted Validation Service to which they can delegate this process, as the one proposed in [27] .
The use of the credentials of an administrator can become in a critical security-related issue when installing static IDSs, as these can be compromised. We then propose the management and utilization of X.509 proxy certificates [28] , generated by system administrators and digitally signed by using their private key. A proxy certificate binds a static IDS to the administrator who digitally signed it. This credential option is the one used in Step 1 (Section 3.1.1).
Besides the validation of credentials, the strength of security mechanisms is a key factor to avoid cryptanalysis attacks. To do so, mechanisms can be classified according to the Level of Assurance (LoA) when authenticating an entity [29] , this defining the fortress of a security mechanism to ensure that entities requesting some information, e.g., recommendations on a newcomer, are really who they claim to be. Thus, the leader of a CIDN can use this mechanism to measure the risk incurred if a weak security mechanism is used. A higher LoA value would mitigate a higher risk.
Note that we have chosen here to use X.509 proxy certificates, although other suitable mechanisms could also be used as long as they provide security in communication and authentication processes, as well as to classify their security parameters into level of assurances. For example, it is possible to make use of clique-based key management solutions to find the most trustworthy entity (security domain, in our context) in a certificate graph [30, 31] .
Such levels of assurance were firstly proposed in 2003 by the US Department of Defense, defining four levels according to the potential risk of errors in the authentication processes [32] . These levels are minimal, moderate, substantial, and high assurance. From this specification, an additional set of guides was developed by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) with the technical requirements for each LoA [33] . Each of them is related to each of the phases involved in the management of the life cycle of an X.509 certificate.
In this work, we have adapted this concept around the levels of assurance to manage X.509-based certificates only, as there are several levels defined by the NIST that does not make much sense in the context presented in this paper. In this way, the same number of levels has been remained but with the following meanings, where LoA 1 is the lowest level and LoA 4 the highest one:
• LoA 1 (minimal). Soft cryptographic algorithms are used, such as 512-bit RSA keys. This protection mechanism is being applied in more than 95 % of the security services deployed on the Internet.
• LoA 2 (moderate). Based on the previous level, a medium cryptographic implementation can be used through RSA key sizes greater or equal to 1024 bits.
• LoA 3 (substantial). Strong cryptographic implementations are used (e.g., Elliptic Curve Cryptography with key sizes greater or equal to 256 bits).
• LoA 4 (high assurance). A hard cryptographic hardware token is used, e.g., a smart card, where X.509-based credentials are securely stored. The knowledge of a secret, or PIN, is required to "unlock" the token.
These levels of assurance are used later in Section 4.3, when the initial reputation score of a newcomer is computed. To this end, we defined (1), where τ(NC) models the level of assurance of a newcomer NC.
Reputation system
We introduce in this section our novel reputation management system aimed to compute the initial reputation score of a newcomer before joining the collaborative alert system. We describe the reputation bootstrapping model for a newcomer, either a static IDS (Section 4.3.1), a mobile IDS (Section 4.3.2), or a new security domain (Section 4.3.3). To this end, models for assessing the usefulness (Section 4.1.1) and willingness (Section 4.1.2) of a newcomer, as well as the similarity between two domains (Section 4.1.3), will be defined beforehand.
Detection skills: usefulness, willingness, and similarity models
In this work, we are modeling each detection skill ds i of an IDS as a 3-tuple containing
• the name of the detection skill;
• the number of security policies employed to cope with the attack detection addressed by the detection skill; and
• a priority that entails a severity level to each one of the security detection rules.
In summary, a detection skill would be defined as ds i =<name, num security policies, priority>. As an example, consider the 34 types of attack classes that Snort is capable of detecting [34] . They are in turn classified into four priorities: High, with 10 types of attack classes; Medium, with 16; Low, with 7; and Very Low, with just one type of attack class. A low priority value corresponds to high severity or risk alerts. That is, a priority value of 1 (High) represents the most severe, whereas 4 (Very Low) is the least severe, as defined by Snort in its specification.
Let DS = {ds 1 , ds 2 , ..., ds n } represent the complete spectrum of n detection skills demanded by the CAS to detect distributed threats, where each ds i models the specific capability to detect a given type of attack class. In particular, DS x = {ds i 1 , ds i 2 , ..., ds i nx } identifies the set of n x ≤ n detection skills required by the domain D x ∈ CAS , with DS x ⊆ DS . This latter set of detection skills is determined by the D x 's administrator(s) according to the vulnerabilities inherent to the services and resources of D x , while DS is built by merging all detection skills claimed by each CIDN.
On the other hand, let DS = {ds 1 , ds 2 , . . . , ds n } denote the accumulator vector where ds i ∈ N is associated with the i-th detection skill belonging to DS , i.e., related to ds i ∈ DS , and represents the number of detection units in the CAS avowing such ds i . As before, DS x = {ds i 1 , ds i 2 , . . . , ds i nx } is the accumulator vector for D x . For example, DS x = {5, 0} means that there are five detection units (static or mobile IDSs) providing ds i 1 to detect its corresponding type of attack class, while the second item "0" states that the second type of attack class, detected through ds i 2 , is uncovered by making use of the detection units that are concurrently collaborating with D x .
Finally, each detection unit DU m , either a static or mobile IDS, can be modeled according to its detection skills as DU m = (du 1 , du 2 , ..., du n ). Each du i ∈ [0, 1] represents the percentage of security policies needed to fulfill ds i that DU m is able to offer to D x with which it is collaborating, or it hopes to collaborate as DU m has just launched the bootstrapping process. Thus, du i = 0 means that DU m does not support ds i at all, while du i = 1 indicates that it is capable of supporting all the required security policies so as to detect the corresponding type of attack class.
Usefulness model
The usefulness of DU m when joining D x represents the utility of such a newcomer filling detection skill gaps with the aim of enhancing the overall detection capabilities of D x . Therefore, the usefulness function of DU m as a newcomer of D x , denoted as Φ x (DU m ) ∈ [0, 1], is given by (2) .
where du i k ∈ DU m and ds i k ∈ DS x , ∀k ∈ [1, n k ]. Studying such an equation with a little bit attention, we have that:
• If du i k = 0, ∀k, then Φ x (DU m ) = 0, which makes perfect sense as DU m is not able to provide any detection skill at all in which D x is interested.
• If du i k = 1 and
In short, every ds i k of DU m , in the very best case (du i k = 1 and ds i k = 0), could contribute
to the final value of Φ x (DU m ). But beyond the extreme cases, whenever a concrete du i k = 0 there will be no contribution because of this ds i k , while if we have that du i k = 1 then there will be a contribution of 1 n x +ds i k . The larger ds i k is (meaning more detection units are capable of detecting ds i k ), the lower will be the contribution of such ds i k to Φ x (DU m ).
Finally, we do not want to consider only the amount of detection units providing ds i k , i.e., ds i k , but also the overall reputation of those IDSs, which is represented as µ x (ds i k ) ∈ [0, 1]. Accordingly, (2) is reformulated as shown in (3). Thus, if there are many detection units providing ds i k , say ds i k = 100, but µ x (ds i k ) → 0 and, in addition, du i k = 1, then such ds i k should yield a contribution close to 1 n x in the final computation of Φ x (DU m ).
A simple average of reputation scores would produce a "poor" value of µ x (ds i k ). Instead, we propose a smarter way of computing such an overall reputation. For example, assume ds i k = 100 and the following two possibilities:
• 90 DUs with a very low reputation (say 0.1), but 10 with the maximum score (1.0). The average would be µ x (ds i k ) = 0.19, though ds i k would be completely covered.
• 50 DUs with a reputation score of 0.4 and the remaining 50 with 0.6. Now, µ x (ds i k ) = 0.5.
We can clearly state that the former would be better than the latter, as ds i k would be better covered. Yet, the overall reputation scores indicate right the contrary. To avoid this kind of inconsistencies, we propose (4) to define µ x (ds i k ).
where DU ds i k represents all the detection units DU ∈ D x providing ds i k ; max{Rep x (DU ds i k )} is the maximum reputation score among all detections units in DU ds i k ; and ϕ({Rep x (DU ds i k )}) represents a measure of dispersion such as the range, the mean difference, or the standard deviation. Note that the actual computation and/or updating of the reputation score Rep x (DU ds i k ) are out of scope of this paper.
We have chosen the mean difference as a measure of dispersion, which can be expressed as shown in (5).
By using this measure of dispersion, we would obtain the following results for the aforementioned example:
• µ x (ds i k ) = 1 − 0.164 = 0.836, for 90 DUs with Rep x (DU ds i k ) = 0.1 and other 10 DUs with Rep x (DU ds i k ) = 1.
• µ x (i k ) = 0.6 − 0.101 = 0.499, with Rep x (DU ds i k ) = 0.4 for 50 DUs and Rep x (DU i k ) = 0.6 for the rest.
As it can be observed, the application of this measure of dispersion offers better and more realistic outcomes as it considers not only the data dispersion, but also their distribution.
Willingness model
As shown in Step 7 of Figure 3 , whenever a mobile IDS arrives to the D x 's CIDN, the domain leader DL x asks it for its detection skills in order to assess the usefulness of the newcomer. The detection skills of such a mobile IDS, as presented in Section 4.1.1, are represented as DU m = (du 1 , du 2 , ..., du n ). Moreover, in Step 8 of Figure 3 , DL x has the opportunity to negotiate with the newcomer a different set of detection skills. To this end, DL x suggests it an alternative configuration, but as close as possible to the previous one, consisting of activating or improving some of its detection skills. Such proposal is represented as
The mobile IDS will reply back to DL x with a new tuned set of detection skills, namely DU m = ( du 1 , du 2 , ..., du n ). The complete process is depicted in more detail in Figure 4 , keeping the same numbering of steps shown in Figure 3 . The final actual value of each du i will depend on the willingness of the new detection unit to collaborate with the system. In order to model such a willingness, expressed as x (DU m ), we propose to quantify it as shown in (6).
Thus, if for example du i ≥ du i , it means that DU m is willing to improve ds i even beyond the level expected by DL x . On the contrary, if du i ≤ du i , then DU m is going to offer a worse or equal deal than the initial one provided in the negotiation phase, with regards to the fulfillment of ds i .
Finally,
measures the degree of improvement of DU m with respect to the initial accomplishment of ds i , when du i < du i < du i .
Similarity model
When two security domains of the CAS want to collaborate each other, regardless they belong to the same or different administrative domains, they need to establish a new trust relationship, e.g., D A and D B in Figure 1 , before sharing their alerts with the aim of detecting distributed threats. The reputation bootstrapping process at domain level implies to individually compute the initial reputation score of one security domain over the other in two different agreement processes. To this end, we define a so called similarity model that determines the likeness between two given security domains with regards to the detection skills that each one of them acknowledges to accomplish.
The similarity between two domains D x and D y , denoted as λ(D x , D y ) ∈ [0, 1], is then computed as shown in (7).
Recommendations from the CAS about a newcomer
As mentioned in Section 2.2, and described subsequently in Section 3.1, whenever a newcomer NC, either mobile IDS or security domain, joins a given domain D x , the latter has the option to query other trusted domains within the CAS about their recommendations regarding such a newcomer. The final aim is to find the most reputable path leading to the most trustworthy domain having recommendations about the NC's behavior in sharing alerts.
To this end, D x queries all its trusted neighboring domains whether they possess some behavioral-based information, i.e., recommendations, about NC. If so, the y-th domain will return its recommendation, denoted as Rec y (NC). Moreover, D x will only keep and use the recommendations received from its neighbors with the highest confidence on the discovered trust paths, after being weighted with the direct trust deposited by D x on each one of its neighbors D y , namely T (D x , D y ). In case one neighbor D y has no reputation information about NC, i.e., Rec y (NC), then the same process is recursively spread to the D y 's neighbors until reaching the time to live threshold defined beforehand.
Note that by keeping and back-propagating only a single recommendation response, i.e., the recommendation regarding NC through the most reputable trust path, each intermediate domain in the trust path acts as a sink node in the query process. The main advantages of this approach are twofold. On the one hand, all direct trust relationships throughout the trust path are not revealed, and therefore the privacy of the domains within the CAS regarding their trust relationships is preserved. On the other hand, the traffic overhead introduced by this querying mechanism is reduced, as the amount of messages transmitted over the network is also shrunk.
The best trust path built so far up to a given D x , which maximizes the confidence that D x can deposit on the most trustworthy domain D y having Rec y (NC), would be computed by using (8) . This Rec y (NC), also denoted as Rec CAS (NC) from now on, will be back-propagated together with the trust path exhibiting the highest confidence. That is, the trust path whose T tp i (D x , D y ) is maximum from the perspective of D x . The first term in (8), i.e., 1 |tp i | , is used to, on equal conditions, punish lengthy trust paths. As mentioned before in Section 2.2, the longer the trust path is, the lower the confidence the domains belonging to it will provide to the 13 requesting domain. In other words, the further the domain providing reputation information about NC is, the less trusted will be the path leading to it. This aspect is well-known in the literature under the name of forgetting factor.
Besides that, what (8) Figure 3 and explained in Section 3.1.2. Their final recommendation about mIDS i joining D x , denoted as Rec mIDS (D x , mIDS i ), can be computed using (9) .
Again, the aggregated recommendation from all the mobile IDSs belonging to D x , mIDS j ∈ D x , and having recommendation information about mIDS i , Rec mIDS j (mIDS i ), is computed by means of a weighted average taking into account the freshness of each one of such recommendations.
As defined above, in the case of computing the confidence that D x has on a recommendation gathered from the CAS, the equation shown in (9) is also subjected to the trust that D x can deposit on the mobile IDSs currently collaborating with D x . This confidence, T mIDS (D x , mIDS i ), is given by (10) .
Finally, the equation proposed in (11) computes a single recommendation score by taking into consideration all the recommendations gathered from those sources that maintain behavioral-based information about the newcomer. Concretely, recommendations gathered from other trusted domains within the CAS and the ones provided by mobile IDSs belonging to D x . That is, Rec CAS (NC) and Rec mIDS (D x , NC), respectively. All these recommendations are weighted according to the trust that D x has on the external sources that have provided such recommendation scores.
where θ tp i and θ mIDS correspond to the trust that D x has on the domains providing the NC's recommendation score and those provided by the mobile IDSs currently collaborating with D x , respectively. Both are quantified as
Reputation bootstrapping process of a newcomer
This section presents our proposal for bootstrapping the reputation of a newcomer in a given CIDN. Specifically, we provide one solution for the case where the newcomer is a static IDS (Section 4.3.1), a second solution when the newcomer is a mobile IDS (Section 4.3.2), and a final one for those scenarios where the newcomer is a security domain (Section 4.3.3). We will see how each one of the different models described above (utility, willingness, similarity, as well as recommendations) plays an important role in the reputation bootstrapping process for newcomers. Each solution takes also into account the possibility of having past reputation information about the newcomer in the domain where it joins. Freshness information will be assessed to determine whether it is actually a cold-start or reputation bootstrapping process (past information does not exist in the former case, or it is substantially old).
Reputation bootstrapping for a newcomer static IDS
When it is about determining the initial reputation score of a new static IDS, installed by a system administrator so as to monitor local services or resources of a specific network zone, we need to consider the following elements in computing such an initial reputation score: i) the usefulness of such an IDS within the context of the domain where it is being deployed; and ii) the level of assurance provided by such a static IDS.
The equation given by (12) shows a function f s comprising all the needed elements to compute the reputation score of the newcomer static IDS, namely sIDS i , when it joins the domain D x at time t. (1).
Before showing the actual definition of f s , let us see some of the properties that such a function should fulfill:
(sIDS i ), and such an information is very recent (∆t → 0), then the output of f s should be very similar to such a reputation score.
If there is no past reputation information within D x regarding sIDS i , or it is substantially old (not valid anymore), then f s will depend exclusively on the usefulness and level of assurance of the newcomer.
•
The output of f s should be proportional to the sIDS i 's reputation score within D x ; that is, to Rep
The output of f s should be proportional to the usefulness of sIDS i within D x ; that is, to Φ D x (sIDS i ).
• f s (Φ, τ) ∝ τ
The output of f s should be proportional to the sIDS i 's level of assurance; that is, to τ(sIDS i ).
Therefore, deeming all the aforementioned considerations, we propose to compute the initial reputation score of a newcomer static IDS by following (13) . Such a definition of the function f s fulfills all the requirements stated above.
Reputation bootstrapping for a newcomer mobile IDS
The following elements should be considered when computing the initial reputation score of a newcomer mobile IDS, beyond the potential existence of past records about its reputation score and their corresponding timestamp: i) the usefulness of the mobile IDS in the domain where it wants to join; ii) the willingness of such a newcomer in tuning its detection skills to improve the overall detection coverage; iii) the level of assurance of the mobile IDS; and iv) the recommendations provided by other trusted domains where the newcomer has participated, and the ones provided by other mobile IDSs with whom it has interacted too.
The function f m shown in (14) considers all previous elements to compute the reputation score of the newcomer mobile IDS, namely mIDS i , when it joins the domain D x at time t.
Again, some requirements to be fulfilled by the function f m are presented next before showing its actual definition: 15
(mIDS i ), and such an information is very recent (∆t → 0), then the output of f m should be very similar to such a reputation score.
If there is no past reputation information within D x regarding mIDS i , or it is substantially old, then f m will depend exclusively on the usefulness, willingness, and level of assurance of the newcomer, as well as the recommendations about such a newcomer gathered from other trusted domains and from other mobile IDSs.
The output of f m should be proportional to the mIDS i 's reputation score within D x ; that is, to Rep
(mIDS i ).
If there is no recommendation from either other trusted domains or other mobile IDSs regarding the newcomer, i.e., we are facing a cold-start process, then the initial reputation score of such a newcomer will only depend on its usefulness, willingness, and level of assurance.
The output of f m should be proportional to the recommendations gathered from other trusted domains and from mobile IDSs that are currently collaborating with D x ; that is, to Rec CAS ,mIDS (D x , mIDS i ).
If the usefulness of mIDS i is high, or very high, then the output of f m should be proportionally high. However, if the initial usefulness of the newcomer is low, or very low, but at the same time it has a high, or very high, willingness to tune its detection skills, then the output of f m should be proportionally high too.
If the usefulness of mIDS i is low, or very low, and, in addition, such a newcomer has a low, or very low, willingness to improve its detection skills, then the output of f m should be proportionally low as well.
• f m (Φ, , τ) ∝ τ
The output of f m should be proportional to the mIDS i 's level of assurance; that is, to τ(mIDS i ).
Once argued all the requirements to be accomplished by f m in (14), we can provide a formal definition of such a function in (15) fulfilling the aforementioned requisites.
where f m is formally defined as
Reputation bootstrapping for a newcomer domain
Finally, when a security domain D y joins another existing domain D x for collaboration purposes, the latter needs to compute an initial reputation score regarding the former; concretely, D x has to compute Rep
Note that the reverse process should be performed in a parallel manner in order to establish a bidirectional trust relationship between D x and D y . To this end, the following elements must be considered, beyond the possible past reputation information about D y : i) the similarity between D x and D y ; ii) the D y 's level of assurance; and iii) the recommendations provided by other trusted domains about D y . Thus, (16) shows a function f d bringing together all these required elements.
Before providing an actual definition of f d , it is required to analyze the formal requirements that such a function must carry out:
(D y ), and such an information is very recent (∆t → 0), then the output of f d should be very similar to such a reputation score.
If there is no past reputation information within D x regarding D y , or it is substantially old, then f d will depend exclusively on the similarity between D x and D y , the level of assurance of the newcomer, as well as the recommendations gathered from other trusted domains about D y .
The output of f d should be proportional to the D y 's reputation from the perspective of D x ; that is, to Rep
• if
If there is no recommendation from other trusted domains about D y , i.e., we are facing a cold-start process, then the initial reputation score of D y will only depend on its similarity with D x and its level of assurance.
The output of f d should be proportional to the recommendations gathered from other trusted domains about D y ; that is, to Rec CAS (D x , D y ).
The output of f d should be proportional to the similarity of the newcomer D y and D x ; that is, to λ(D x , D y ).
The output of f d should be proportional to the D y 's level of assurance; that is, to τ(D y ).
Hence, once the prerequisites to be fulfilled by f d in (16) have been analyzed and clarified, we are in a position to actually define it as given by (17) . Such a definition of f d is fully compliant with the aforementioned requirements.
where f d is formally defined as
Rec CAS This f d encompasses the two possible cases when D y intends to join D x . On the one hand, when there is no recommendation from the CAS about D y , or the trust on such a recommendation is null, i.e., T tp i (D x , D y ) = 0, D x is facing a cold-start process. In this case, just the first part of f d is considered as D x can only base its decision on the personal information provided by D y to compute its initial reputation score: its detection skills to compute the similarity degree with D x and its level of assurance. On the other hand, D x faces a reputation bootstrapping process when D x receives some recommendation from the CAS about the newcomer; that is, when T tp i (D x , D y ) > 0. In this case, the D y 's initial reputation score will depend on the confidence that D x has on the trusted domain having Rec CAS (final recommendation value about D y ) and also taking into consideration such a Rec CAS score.
Experimental results
In this section, we present some experimental results to demonstrate the accuracy and robustness of our proposal in computing the initial reputation score of a newcomer. The fundamental aim behind these experiments is twofold:
• prove the benefits of adopting security alerts generated by mobile IDSs in order to enhance the detection coverage required by the CIDNs; and
• confirm how recommendations provided by trusted information sources can strengthen the system in order to identify compromised newcomers showing a malicious behavior before they interact with a CIDN, although the latter has no historical information about such newcomers.
Experimental setting
We built a simulator with the implementation of a collaborative alert system, including all the architecture components described in Section 2 and the proposed reputation management system in order to compute the initial reputation score of a newcomer, as formally defined in Section 4. In the experiments introduced below we have used a CAS composed of 3 administrative domains, where 15 security domains (CIDNs) have been deployed equitably, 10 static IDSs per CIDN, 300 mobile IDSs traveling across domains and also collaborating with them, and 10 detection skills.
Besides the reputation system proposed above, we introduce next the concept of satisfaction about an alert, as it is needed to measure the IDSs' behavior (honest or malicious) so as to demonstrate how robust our proposal is as they are progressively compromised. Thus, the satisfaction of a domain D x in assessing an alert produced by a detection unit DU m , either static or mobile IDSs, or even an alert gathered from other trusted domains, is computed as given by (18) . This equation, denoted as S at
, is an adaptation of the one presented in [17] , Eq. (4) in such a paper, but following the nomenclature of concepts herein proposed.
S at
where 1] is the confidence that D x has on the alert truthfulness; and ds i k (priority) ∈ [0, 1] defines the priority of the k-th detection skill demanded by D x . In order to compute T (t) D x (alert), we have adopted a traditional voting-based scheme [35] . The decision-making process behind this scheme follows an approach based on the majority, where the reputation of all the detection units involved in this process has also been considered.
Experiment 1: Assessing detection coverage
The main goal of this first experiment is to assess how the detection coverage of a CIDN varies from using static IDSs only to also include security alerts produced by mobile IDSs. We consider a particular configuration of the CAS, taken from an existing one at a given simulation time, with a detection coverage as the one shown in Figure 5a .
Each row in this map represents a detection skill demanded by the CAS, and each column corresponds to a given CIDN. Each cell (i, j) depicts a color proportional to the amount of security policies of the i-th detection skill covered by all IDSs in the j-th CIDN, weighted with the IDSs' reputation score. Darker gray colors indicate high detection coverage, and vice versa. Note that cells represented with a × indicate that the CIDN requires no protection to use such a detection skill. The detection coverage of Figure 5a is the result of deploying all static IDSs for the very first time, so that each CIDN has to face a cold-start process, which can be tackled by (13) . The results achieve an average of 17.46 % in the global detection coverage at CAS level.
By taking this configuration, we have launched the deployment of all mobile IDSs in different CIDNs in a random way, obtaining the detection coverage shown in Figure 5b . Such results are obtained after executing the cold-start process of the mobile IDSs by following (15) . This configuration achieves a better global detection coverage of 36.38 %. Note that, at this point, no IDS has yet collaborated with the system. As a first conclusion, we can observe that mobile IDSs can initially improve the detection capabilities required by a CIDN to detect distributed threats.
Next step is to determine i) how the CAS operates with a usual behavior (static IDSs producing alerts and mobile IDSs collaborating in detection tasks while traveling across security and administrative domains); and ii) how robust the reputation bootstrapping process is with a given percentage of compromised mobile IDSs. is obtained after injecting 50 types of attack classes, provoking the generation of their corresponding alerts, and simulating at the same time that mobile IDSs move from one domain to another. Note that these movements across domains trigger to execute the reputation bootstrapping process in each of them. As seen in Figure 5c , the detection coverage reaches an average of 75.74 % only considering mobile IDSs with a complete honesty. Note that the CAS has achieved this improvement because of mobile IDSs have gained better reputation scores after collaborating properly. Instead, these reputations will be decreased as malicious behaviors appear progressively, thereby decaying the global detection coverage at the same progression. There is a point where the detection coverage tends to the first configuration (without mobile IDSs). In this case, we can observe that Figure 5f , with 30 % of malicious mobile IDSs, is very similar to Figure 5a . This means that mobile IDSs with very low reputation scores are isolated from detecting processes and, as a consequence, the CAS only operates with static IDSs and by accepting alerts from other trusted domains. Due to this, we can affirm that our reputation bootstrapping model can support around 20 % of malicious mobile IDSs before being discarded as valuable detection units.
Experiment 2: Evolution of static and mobile IDSs in behavior over time
In this experiment we analyze how reputation scores of static and mobile IDSs vary over time to compromise and misbehavior, although mobile IDSs move across domains. Both types of IDSs face reputation bootstrapping processes for each percentage of malicious IDSs before collaborating with their CIDN. After that, such static and mobile IDSs produce the corresponding alerts to the injection of 50 types of attack classes. In addition, note that mobile IDSs will be placed at different domains from one test to other. Figure 6 shows the results of this experiment.
Reputation scores are rapidly decremented when there are less than 5 % of malicious IDSs. This finding is very interesting from the perspective of mobile IDSs, as they follow a similar pattern than static IDSs although mobile IDSs' reputation is computed in each movement across domains. This accuracy is due to the use of recommendations provided by other trusted parties of the CAS. Mobile IDSs can travel across security domains, or even administrative domains, but CIDNs always keep an eye on such detection units although they have not yet participated with them.
It is worth mentioning that previous experiments have remained the same trustworthiness among security domains, as well as their goodness in sharing alerts with others. Due to this, and following the same configuration that the previous test of this experiment, the last test maintain the same experimental conditions but varying the percentage In this case, the results show the same tendency than before, although now more accentuated in losing reputation scores faster. Nonetheless, our reputation bootstrapping model maintains its robustness up to around 20 % of malicious IDSs without losing its detection accuracy. In conclusion, outcomes demonstrate that our proposal is accuracy and robust in the presence of malicious IDSs.
Finally, note that we have included outcomes up to 100 % of malicious IDSs in Figures 6 and 7 , although it could be gettable from intuition that if all IDSs misbehave, then the IDSs' reputation will be 0. Anyway, such data are important for our proposal so as to demonstrate resulting behaviors in such situations in comparison with other related works. For example, shapes in both figures would be represented as smooth parabolic curves if using voting-based strategies (majority, plurality or weighted average). Malicious behaviors will prevail to honest ones from 50 % of misbehaving IDSs when using a voting scheme based on the majority. From that point on, the initial reputation score of IDSs will increase again up to reach similar scores to the first simulation, where there are no malicious IDSs.
Related work
Cold-start and reputation bootstrapping problems have generated a lot of interest in recent years with different nuances, primarily depending on the environment where solutions are confined. Some works have concentrated their efforts in multi-agent systems (MAS), in which agents desire to pick the best partners to interact with. For example, in [36, 37] , the authors proposed two models of trust where certified reputation allows a trustor (trust givers) to offer trustees (trust receivers), by means of using X.509 certificates-based asymmetric keying mechanisms, with a private list of all reputation ratings provided by other third trustees from past interactions.
More recent works are shifting the focus towards the assessment of users' trustworthiness in e-marketplaces. In this new scenario, the confidence on a seller must be checked by buyers before starting the desired interaction with it, either an experienced or a callow seller. Sellers are modeled according to some of their attributes, such as the location, type and price of the products, or the number of items sold so far, and depending on such attribute values they are then classified into predefined categories built by using past data records of other sellers. For example, the authors of [38] proposed a fuzzy semantic decision tree learning method to generalize nominal and non-nominal attributes aimed at building general instances of sellers.
In the last few years, current researches are proposing probabilistic trust models in which past experiences with well-known entities are categorized as stereotypes [12, 39] . Each of these stereotypes is modeled as a feature vector that defines the behavioral profile that a newcomer can adopt. The main drawback of this approach is that it requires historical information about old entities that previously interacted with the domain in order to build such feature vectors. In the same research area, other works are proposing different trust models based on known categories or contexts, where newcomers are assigned to one of them according to the security levels that the given service provider (or security domain, in our case) has established depending on its security needs [40] . Newcomers will then be registered with the reputation score corresponding to the nearest context in which they better fit.
On the other hand, there are other simple alternatives that have also to be considered. The most popular solution is to assign a constant score by default to all newcomers, being 0 and 0.5 the ones most used when the newcomer's initial reputation score is assigned in [0,1]. An initial reputation score of 0 implies that newcomers need a long-term cooperation until gaining its right reputation, something quite unlikely in highly distributed environments. Instead, a neutral score of 0.5 is an unfair solution in systems where, for example, the majority of benevolent entities hold a reputation close to such a value. Additionally, the latter approach is prone to endure whitewashing attacks, where a malicious entity discards its current bad behavior for getting a new reputation score higher than before. Solutions following both approaches can be found in [41] for the lowest score, and in [42] for a neutral one (0.5). Instead, other works establish such a reputation score after the newcomer has interacted n times with the security domain, as the one presented in [11] . This approach can be however unrealistic in highly distributed environments as a mobile IDS may leave the domain before being computed its initial reputation, failing to perform n interactions.
Finally, it is worth emphasizing that there are other trust and reputation models that take into account indirect experiences that the entity has had in other security domains [43] , in addition to the direct ones, if any. Such domains can supply the requesting one with some recommendations about how good a given entity has been in interacting with each of them. Although this approach may not take into consideration what occurs when a newcomer joins a new security domain, it is particularly interesting as the requesting domain could incorporate the newcomer's indirect experiences, if any, in calculating its initial reputation score.
To the best of our knowledge, our proposal is the first to suggest a novel and promising solution to face the coldstart and reputation bootstrapping problems in the context of collaborative alert systems, although it can be easily extrapolated to other particular scenarios by taking the special features of their main actors. Furthermore, the design of our reputation bootstrapping model is also prepared to compute the initial reputation score when the first newcomer joins the system; that is, when the system is executed from scratch. In either of the works commented above, most of them set aside this special situation with regards to the cold-start problem. They do not state what happens at the beginning of the system, i.e., when there is no information about anyone, as their solutions assume that they have information about other entities which have previously participated with their systems.
Finally, just to comment that there is no similar related works with which we can perform a fair comparative analysis. No existing technique is focused on the detection context we are addressing here, namely, collaborative alert systems where IDSs are sharing alerts to detect distributed threats.
Conclusion and future work
In this paper we have presented a novel reputation bootstrapping model addressing aimed at assigning an initial reputation score to a newcomer. This model has been designed to address two of the existing problems in distributed and collaborative environments, by taking collaborative alert systems as a particular scenario of interest: the cold-start problem, where newcomers are complete strangers from the perspective of the system; and the reputation bootstrapping problem, where newcomers want to rejoin the system with which have already been collaborating (they are old acquaintances). The proposed model takes into account the three sorts of entities that have been identified as main actors in collaborative alert systems, namely: static IDSs, representing fixed entities to monitor local services of a network; mobile IDSs, belonging to roaming users with particular capabilities in a wireless mobility context, which are used as "small" detection units from which to gather further security alerts; and security domains, whose main desire in collaboration is to enhance their detection accuracy when detecting distributed threats. To this end, we have defined some concepts, such as usefulness of an newcomer IDS or similarity between two security domains, used in this work to assess newcomers in an extreme case (cold-start), although they are also quite valuable when there are external recommendations gathered from other trusted information sources (reputation bootstrapping).
Subsequent to this work, we are working on incentive-based policies to promote collaboration of mobile IDSs, this being a key factor in the success of a realistic collaborative alert system. Furthermore, we have considered as future work to go deeply into how differences in recommendations can be modeled when several security domains assess the same mobile IDS in a different fashion, when this entity has performed the same interactions in all of them. This fact is also known in the literature as subjectivity difference. 
